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Introduction  
This study examines the relation between women on boards and company GHG 
emissions related disclosure in annual and sustainability reports. We test whether the presence 
of women on boards is associated with GHG emissions disclosure and the quality of disclosures 
made by companies. We apply institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to analyse 
the organisational practice of appointing female directors and apply the board capital model 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Haynes and Hillman, 2010) to explain why women on boards lead 
to GHG emissions related disclosures that are of higher quality. 
The motivation for this study arises from the importance of GHG related emissions 
disclosures within the area of social responsibility and ethical reporting (Moroney et al., 2012; 
McNicholas and Windsor, 2011; Milne and Grubnic, 2011; Ferguson et al., 2016). 
Management of climate change related issues such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a 
significant strategic and ethical issue for companies (Liesen et al. 2015; Linnenluecke et al., 
2015b; Luo and Tang, 2014). Understanding how to deal with the negative impact of climate 
change has global significance (Linnenluecke et al., 2015a; Linnenluecke et al., 2015c; 
Moroney et al., 2012) as parties consider how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and manage 
the risks and uncertainties of carbon pollution (Clarkson et al., 2014; Solomon et al., 2011; 
Tauringana and Chitambo, 2015). Investors and other stakeholders increasingly require 
meaningful and transparent disclosures regarding GHG emissions and the management of 
related risks (Hartman et al., 2013; Solomon et al., 2011).  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we present 
analyses of GHG emissions related disclosures in annual and sustainability reports. GHG 
emissions related information is part of sustainability reporting presented by companies in 
annual, sustainability, integrated and online reports (GRI, 2015). Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP, 2014) data and women on boards have been examined in prior studies (Prado-Lorenzo 
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and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Ben-Amar et al., 2015; Liao et al., 2015). However, less attention 
has been given to GHG related disclosures in annual and sustainability reports. These 
disclosures are an important and accessible source of voluntary information on environmental 
issues for investors and other users (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Owen, 2008).  
The second contribution relates to our use of a sample of Australian companies that 
voluntarily appoint women to their board. European countries such as Italy, Norway and the 
Netherlands have mandated quotas for women on boards (Deloitte, 2015). The Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations included a recommendation for listed 
companies to disclose their board diversity policy and initiatives in 2010 (ASX, 2010), which 
is after our sample period of 2007.  The relatively low number of female directors on Australian 
company boards compared to other countries (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002) suggests these 
companies are early adopters of women on boards. Therefore, companies are likely to be 
voluntarily appointing women to boards to add value to their company in our sample period.  
Our third contribution is the development of an index that provides an estimate of GHG 
emission related disclosure quality. GHG emission related disclosures are recommended by the 
global reporting initiative (GRI) discussion of sustainability reporting (GRI, 2015; Moroney et 
al., 2012). The GRI G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI, 2015) define quality of 
sustainability reporting by reference to principles including balance (positive and negative 
aspects of performance should be included and information should be unbiased), comparability 
(with past performance, company objectives, and other organisations), accuracy 
(communicated by qualitative and detailed quantitative indicators), timeliness, clarity and 
reliability. The reliability principle relates to gathering, recording, compiling and analysing 
processes used in preparing the report so that the disclosure can be examined to establish the 
quality of the information. We adopt the principles specified by the GRI to develop an index 
3 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Hollindale, J., Kent, P., Routledge, J., & Chapple, L. (2019). Women on boards and greenhouse gas 
emission disclosures. Accounting and Finance, 59(1), 277-308, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12258. 
This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. 
 
of quality of GHG emissions disclosures by adapting an index relying on the GRI identified 
elements by Clarkson et al. (2008) to provide an estimate of quality of disclosures.  
It is an advantage to study quality of disclosures because the quantity of disclosures 
could be a nominal gesture to maintain legitimacy and enhance the reputation of the company 
without having any real desire to improve the transparency of reporting of GHG emissions 
related disclosures. Extensive disclosure may be of limited use if the data is low quality and 
does not permit a substantive assessment of company GHG emissions strategy and 
performance (O’Donovan, 2002; Clarkson et al., 2011).  
Finally, our study provides evidence for policy-making by examining whether 
voluntary governance choices such as women on boards enhance disclosure. A mandatory 
disclosure regime is unnecessary if companies have governance structures that result in ethical 
and transparent GHG emissions related disclosures.  
 Our results show that companies with more than one women on their board are more 
likely to make GHG emissions related disclosures in company annual and sustainability reports 
that are of higher quality. We find that companies with multiple female directors make more 
soft disclosures, which includes information on vision and strategy, environmental profile and 
environmental initiatives. Companies with multiple female directors also make more hard 
disclosures that are objective statements related to GHG emissions.. 
2. Theory and Hypothesis 
The board of directors has the responsibility for strategy and reporting GHG emissions 
and it is important that companies structure their board so they have the capacity to manage 
GHG emissions and other climate change related risks (Tauringana and Chitambo, 2015). This 
is particularly the case in the Australian institutional setting which is categorised as a market 
governance system that relies on market forces to prompt voluntary action by companies on 
social responsibility issues (Griffiths et al., 2007; Rankin et al., 2011). Diversity in boards, or 
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dissimilarities in directors’ attributes including women on boards (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; 
Brown et al., 2011) is an important dimension of board composition that is capable of 
influencing corporate performance. Research indicates that women on boards increase the 
quality of reported earnings, company reputation, financial and social performance (Van Der 
Walt et al., 2006; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Barua et al., 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gul et 
al., 2013; Chapple and Humphrey, 2014; Post and Byron, 2014; Byron and Post, 2016).  
The different motivations for appointing women on boards influence the capacity for 
them to guide decision-making on GHG emission related reporting. Boards dominated by male 
directors inhibit women directors’ opinions on environmental issues because of sex-based 
biases or stereotyping in the boardroom (Galbreath, 2011). This is particularly the case when 
female director appointments are symbolic in response to regulation or perceived pressure from 
corporate governance recommendations.  
Institutional theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) assists in explaining 
motivations for appointing women to improve board performance in reporting GHG emission 
related reporting rather than a symbolic action to maintain an appearance of commitment to 
board diversity. Organisations are characterised as innovators or late adopters of organisational 
practices within institutional theory (Dillard et al., 2004) and women on boards are an 
innovation in the Australian corporate sector.  
Companies that are motivated by innovation recognise that women on boards can 
enhance a company’s competitive advantage through their experience, skills and broader 
perspective (Jehn et al., 1999; Galbreath, 2011). Innovative companies appoint female directors 
as part of a strategic board development plan to secure benefits that female directors bring 
(Hillman et al., 2007). In contrast, symbolic appointments by late-adopters can lead to the 
appointment of female directors without relevant expertise or experience to enhance board 
processes (Rose, 2007; Huse et al., 2009). In the case of symbolic appointments, an appearance 
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of board gender diversity is maintained without female directors playing an influential role 
(Nielsen and Huse, 2010b).  
Our study is conducted in the Australian setting during a period that has a low rate of 
female board membership and is in the early stage of adopting women on boards as 
organisational practice. Therefore, based on institutional theory analysis, we expect that 
companies in our sample with female directors are innovative, early adopters of women on 
boards whose motivation is to improve board performance and gain a competitive advantage 
(Dillard et al., 2004). In this setting, female directors are more likely to have a positive 
influence on GHG disclosure strategy.  
The board capital model explains why the contribution of women on boards enhances 
GHG emissions disclosure strategy (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; 
Galbreath, 2012). Board capital includes the human capital and relational or social capital 
provided by board members (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and is derived from the experience, 
expertise, knowledge, reputation and skills of directors. Relational or social capital includes 
directors’ actual and potential network of relationships, ties and external contingencies 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The extent of board capital determines the board’s ability to 
provide resources to the firm, which means board capital is closely linked to resource 
dependence theory (Westphal, 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In addition, the board’s ability 
to perform a monitoring function is also determined by aspects of human capital such as 
knowledge, skill and expertise.  
Women on boards increase board capital breadth in various ways. They bring different 
perspectives, experiences and networks to the board and are more open to discussion of difficult 
issues, more likely to engage in independent thinking and are able to enhance overall 
communication (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Hillman et al., 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Hardies et al., 2014). Their different functional, occupational backgrounds and opinions lead 
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to renewed reasoning for the board (Arfken et al., 2004).  
The concept of value attunement extends board capital theory by explaining that value 
attunement increases board capital breadth. Value attunement results from a more receptive, 
expansive and discovery driven approach to social issues and value-attuned directors are aware 
of, and responsive to, the values of corporate stakeholders (Galbreath, 2012; Swanson, 1999). 
Value attunement increases when women are on the board because females are focused on 
building and maintaining relationships, on the needs of others and understanding the social 
demands of stakeholders (Galbreath, 2011; Boulouta, 2013). Management of GHG emissions 
is a relatively new strategic and ethical issue for companies (Liesen et al. 2015; Linnenluecke 
et al., 2015b; Luo and Tang, 2014). Women on boards increase the likelihood that the board 
understands the ethical and social demand of providing meaningful and transparent disclosures 
regarding GHG emissions. This leads to an increased likelihood that companies with women 
on their boards have GHG emissions disclosures that are of higher quality. 
A further extension of the board capital model leading to the prediction that women on 
boards are associated with GHG emissions disclosures is upper echelons theory (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). This theory clarifies that executives act on personalized 
interpretations of strategic situations that are a function of their cognitive frames built around 
knowledge, experiences, values and personalities. Thus, the biases and dispositions of top 
executives can explain organizational behavior. The theory is relevant to analysis of the role of 
women on boards because female directors have different cognitive frames to men, which 
broadens the information brought to board decisions and enhances decision-making processes 
(Post and Byron, 2015; Byron and Post, 2016).  
Women have different values to men on social responsibility issues in that they place 
greater importance on maintaining relationships, responding to the needs of others, greater 
sensitivity to others and consideration of the interests and perspectives of multiple parties (Post 
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et al., 2011; Nielsen and Huse, 2010a). They are also more likely to recognise unethical actions 
and are more responsive to ethical practices (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1994; Williams, 2003). 
Companies with women on their board are more likely to address the emerging strategic issue 
of climate change and GHG emissions and communicate this action to stakeholders because 
female directors increase board capital breadth through value attunement. Women on boards 
are expected to be associated with GHG emission related disclosures in annual and 
sustainability reports that are of higher quality. This leads to our hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Companies that have women on their boards have GHG emissions related 
disclosures in annual and sustainability reports that are of higher quality.  
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample 
The sample consists of Australian listed companies that made GHG emissions related 
disclosures and a matched sample of non-disclosing companies. We identified disclosing 
companies from the annual and sustainability reports of 2059 companies listed on the 
Australian Securities Exchange in 2007. The sample period of 2007 provides a natural 
experimental setting to test whether women on boards are associated with GHG emission 
reporting because there were no quotas or recommendations to appoint women to boards. The 
year 2007 is a year when there were sufficient women on boards to conduct empirical 
archival analysis. It is also before companies were required to report under the National 
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (NGER). This Act provides a single national 
reporting framework for companies meeting defined thresholds to report all GHG emissions, 
reductions, removals and offsets, and all their energy consumption and production from 1 
July 2008 via a government web portal by 31 October, 2009. 
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We also conduct a longitudinal case study for one company covering the annual report 
from 2003 to 2015 to support our empirical analysis and illustrate the influence of multiple 
women on the board and GHG emission disclosure. 
The AspectHuntley FinAnalysis database and company websites are used to obtain the 
reports. For each report, an electronic search of text for the words environment, sustain, 
emission, carbon and their variants was conducted, and from these GHG emission disclosures 
were documented. Only statements relating to the natural environment were examined and 
therefore references to business environment, economic environment and business 
sustainability were ignored.  Annual and sustainability reports that could not be electronically 
searched were read, and any relevant disclosures were extracted. This search identified 231 
companies as making GHG emissions related disclosures in 2007, which represents 
approximately 11 per cent of the listed companies.  
We identified a matched group of non-disclosing companies based on their Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry sector classification and size measured by 
total assets. The sample of disclosing companies was slightly reduced due to missing data on 
some of the variables used in our models. The final pooled sample was 406 companies, with 
203 companies that disclosed GHG emissions data, and 203 matched non-disclosing 
companies. The sampling with replacement procedure meant that there were 169 unique 
companies in the non-disclosing matched sample.  
3.2 Medium of disclosure 
Data for GHG emissions related disclosures in this study are taken from company 
annual reports and sustainability reports. Companies use questionnaire surveys, face-to-face 
meetings with persons of influence, briefings, conferences, hard copy reports, brochures and 
newsletters, and electronic media to communicate environmental issues (Adams and Frost, 
2006). Other communication channels include news’ releases, speeches, links to other web 
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sites (Frost et al., 2005; Esrock and Leichty, 1998), conference calls (Burritt, 2002), and mass 
advertising (Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990).  
Annual and sustainability reports are generally regarded as the most important sources 
of voluntary corporate information (Kamla and Rammal, 2013).  The credibility of disclosures 
in annual reports is high because information is independently audited and all listed companies 
are required to produce an annual report (Ball et al., 2012; Kent and Zunker, 2013). The annual 
report is the main company disclosure vehicle (Jones and Smith, 2014) to outsiders and 
shareholders and its breadth of coverage and availability makes it an influential source to the 
public (Hooks et al., 2002). It is also a way for directors to show they have discharged their 
public accountability (Boyne and Law, 1991  
Sustainability reports are voluntary in Australia but are increasingly supplied by 
companies in Australia, the European Union and the US (Mock et al., 2007; Hodge et al., 2009; 
Boiral, 2013). The combination of annual reports and sustainability report offers a reporting 
framework for us to assess the impact of women on boards and GHG emission disclosures. 
Accordingly, we have chosen the annual and sustainability reports as our sources of 
information. 
3.3 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables used in the analysis are a dichotomous variable for the 
existence of disclosure, and disclosure quality measured by content analysis. Hooks and van 
Staden (2011) found a very high correlation between a dichotomous disclosure indicator and a 
fully weighted disclosure score in their comparison of various forms of content analysis for 
environmental disclosures. Research indicates that managers assess the costs and benefits 
associated with disclosure (and quality of reported disclosures) when communicating to 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Kent and Zunker, 2013). This implies that disclosure 
quality and quantity are likely to be either substitutes or complements and our use of content 
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analysis and a dichotomous indicator increases the information content of our results.  
The first analysis presented examines whether women on boards is associated with 
GHG emissions related disclosure. The dependent variable for this analysis is a dichotomous 
indicator that is coded one if the company made a GHG emissions related disclosure and zero 
otherwise. 
The second analysis examines GHG emissions related disclosure quality applying an 
index based on Clarkson et al. (2008) and the GRI. We adapt this index so that it is specific to 
GHG emissions related disclosures because it is based on the GRI and reflects our definition 
of quality of sustainability reporting. We include items from the index that directly support the 
reporting infrastructure leading to these GHG emissions related disclosures although some of 
these items could also support general environmental disclosures. 
Our adapted GHG emissions related disclosure index is used to rate disclosures as 
objective measures of GHG performance (hard disclosures) or statements (soft disclosures) 
that are difficult to substantiate. Recall that our definition of disclosure recognises both 
qualitative and quantitative disclosures as adding to quality of sustainability reporting. 
However, the GRI reliability principle requires that disclosures can be examined to establish 
the quality of the information. We differentiate between hard and soft disclosures because it is 
easier to examine and verify objective hard statements.  
Items in the broad environmental performance category are excluded, as we are 
interested only in GHG emissions related disclosures. In addition, we excluded an item that 
indicated the existence of a board sustainability committee, as the existence of this board 
committee is included in our analysis as a control variable. We group index items into six 
categories: governance structure and management systems, credibility, environmental 
spending, claims about vision and strategy, environmental profile, and environmental 
initiatives. Each of the categories are classified as either hard disclosures, or soft disclosures. 
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Disclosures regarded as hard are objective GHG related statements, and include three of the 
categories, namely governance structure and management systems, credibility and 
environmental spending. Soft disclosures are statements that lack credibility and substantiation 
(Clarkson et al., 2008) and include the remaining categories of disclosures on vision and 
strategy, environmental profile and environmental initiatives relating to GHG emissions.   
We apply the index to rate the quality of all relevant annual and sustainability report 
information provided by our sample companies. The maximum index score is 34, being 18 for 
hard disclosure items, and 16 for soft disclosure items.  The disclosure quality dependent 
variables used in the analyses are the number of total disclosures, hard and soft disclosures 
derived from the content analysis. Table 1 shows the disclosure index items, and presents 
descriptive statistics for index items, index categories and the hard and soft disclosure 
categories.  
All index items are scored uniformly with one indicating the presence of a particular 
disclosure and zero otherwise. Only one point is awarded per disclosure category regardless of 
how many times disclosures matched the criteria. Two researchers scored the content of 
disclosures and measurement of coding agreement is undertaken using Krippendorff’s 
agreement coefficient (Krippendorff, 2004).  The coefficient is 0.84 (84 per cent), which 
indicates an acceptable reliability distribution (Krippendorff, 2004).  
3.4 Independent Variables 
Our analysis includes a dummy variable coded one for companies that have one female 
on the board of directors (and zero otherwise) and a dummy variable coded one for companies 
that have more than one female on the board of directors (and zero otherwise). This coding 
allows us to determine whether the relation between women on boards and GHG related 
disclosure varies with the level of female board representation. There is discussion in the 
literature regarding critical mass and whether one female on the board makes it a diverse board 
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(Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). A study of Norwegian firms by Torchia et al. (2011) 
suggests that a minimum of three women on the board represents a critical mass, which is 
associated with an enhanced board contribution to firm innovation. We use a dichotomous 
indicator variable rather than the percentage of female directors because very few of the sample 
companies have multiple female directors, and a continuous measure adds little more 
information. This is consistent with the approach in prior studies using Australian data where 
the level of women on boards is relatively low (Chapple and Humphrey, 2014). 
3.5 Control Variables 
We include controls for board governance strength. Independence of the board is 
included as a control, as prior studies have shown this is associated with GHG emissions 
disclosure (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Rankin et al., 2011). We include a 
dummy variable for whether the board has a majority of independent directors, which is coded 
one if the company has a majority of independent directors and zero otherwise. More 
independent boards are expected to have more GHG emissions disclosures, and higher quality 
disclosures, than less independent boards. 
We also include board structure regarding a combined CEO/board chair or otherwise 
as a control variable. A study by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) found the 
existence of a dual CEO/board chairperson was positively associated with the level of GHG 
information disclosed. The analysis includes an indicator variable coded one if the company 
has a dual CEO/board chair structure, and zero otherwise and we expect that a dual CEO/board 
chair is associated with disclosure and higher quality GHG emissions disclosures. 
Prior research also indicates the existence of an audit committee is associated with 
better financial reporting quality (Davidson et al., 2005; Kent and Stewart, 2008; Rainsbury et 
al., 2008), and this finding could extend to voluntary disclosures. Accordingly, a dummy 
variable is included that indicates whether the firm has formed an audit committee. The variable 
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is coded one if the company has an audit committee and zero otherwise. It is expected that the 
existence of an audit committee is associated with disclosure and higher quality disclosures of 
GHG emissions. 
We include a measure of shareholder concentration in addition to controlling for 
governance provided by formal internal governance mechanisms. Substantial shareholders are 
likely to provide monitoring that enhances governance (Cotter and Najah, 2012; Brailsford et 
al., 2002; Brown et al., 2011). Alternatively, Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that more 
dispersed share ownership increases conflicts of interest between principals and owners, 
increasing agency costs and information asymmetry. This is associated with increased 
disclosure to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. Shareholder concentration is 
measured by the percentage of ordinary shares held by shareholders with a five per cent or 
greater interest in the company. No prediction for the direction of shareholder concentration is 
made in the study due to the alternative theoretical perspectives provided. 
Clarkson et al. (2008) find that annual capital investment, which is a proxy for 
equipment age, is positively related to the extent of environmental disclosures. They suggest 
companies with newer, less polluting equipment are motivated to signal positive information 
through disclosure to distinguish themselves from poorer performers. We include a control for 
the age of equipment measured by the ratio of accumulated depreciation of property, plant and 
equipment to its acquisition cost. It is expected that companies with newer equipment provide 
more disclosure of GHG emissions that are of higher quality. 
Prior studies indicate that companies that demonstrate board commitment to the GHG 
emissions issue are more likely to make disclosures and that those disclosures are more credible 
(Stanny and Ely, 2008; Rankin et al., 2011). Therefore, we include a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the board has formed an environment or sustainability committee. The 
variable is coded one if the company has a sustainability or environment committee, and zero 
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otherwise with the expectation that companies creating this committee have disclosure and 
higher quality disclosures of GHG emissions. 
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies adopt environmental reporting when their 
operations are inconsistent, or perceived to be inconsistent, with society’s norms and 
expectations (Cowan and Deegan, 2011; Bebbington et al., 2008,). Numerous previous studies 
provide evidence that legitimisation is an important motivation for companies making 
voluntary disclosures.  
One group of these studies has used proxies for social pressure to identify companies 
that have a propensity to make voluntary disclosures. These proxies include the incidence of 
environmental lobby group activity, prosecution by environmental agencies and adverse media 
coverage resulting in community concern (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 
1996; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2002; Kent and Monem, 2008). We consider 
companies to have greater social pressure when they are the subject of unfavourable media 
reports, and have a greater propensity to make legitimising disclosures. We searched the 
Factiva electronic database for any news items relating to the sample companies for the period 
1 January 2006 to 31 December 2007 to identify whether the companies had adverse media 
reports regarding the natural environment. Search terms used included environment, carbon, 
greenhouse, emissions, sustainability and energy use. We include an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one if the company had an adverse media report and zero otherwise to control 
for the effect of social pressure. It is expected that companies with adverse publicity in the 
media report GHG emission disclosures that are of higher quality to legitimise their companies’ 
operations. 
Companies are more likely to make voluntary environmental disclosures if it materially 
reduces their agency costs of debt. Leverage is included in our analysis to control for reporting 
incentives arising from reliance on debt financing for company operations (Brown et al., 2011). 
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We also include dummy variables that indicate whether the company obtained either new debt 
or equity financing in their accounting period after 2007. This was determined by examining 
the 2008 statement of cash flows and identifying companies that reported proceeds from 
borrowings and proceeds from issues. We expect those companies with higher debt levels and 
those wanting to raise additional equity or debt in the following year to report GHG emissions 
disclosures that are of higher quality. 
Voluntary reporting of environmental and carbon information is costly; therefore, 
financial performance is related to the probability that companies undertake this reporting 
(Jones et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2013). Financial performance is included in our analysis as a 
control variable, and is measured by Tobin’s Q (Guidry and Patten, 2012). It is expected that 
companies with a higher Tobin’s Q provide more and higher quality disclosures of GHG 
emissions.  
3.6 Statistical Analysis 
The equations below show the regression models used to test the hypothesis. The 
dependent variable in Model 1 is a dichotomous indicator for whether the company has made 
a GHG emissions related disclosure (Equation 1 below). The analysis is therefore conducted 
using logistic regression. This analysis uses a matched sample of disclosing and non-disclosing 
companies based on size and industry. Therefore, it is unnecessary to include the size and 
industry controls in model 1.  
The dependent variable for Models 2, 3 and 4 (Equation 2 below) is a continuous 
measure of total, hard and soft disclosures made by each company. The analysis is conducted 
using Tobit regression to account for the censoring of the dependent variable at zero. 
Disclose = f (β0 + β1 Sole female director + β2 Multiple female director +  
Β3 Shareholder concentration + β4 Performance + β5 Equipment age + β6 Leverage +  
Β7 Majority independence + β8 Dual CEO/board chair + β9 Audit committee +  
Β10 Environment committee + β11 Adverse media + β12 New debt +  
β13 New equity + e              (1) 
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Total / Hard / Soft = β1 Sole female director + β2 Multiple female director +  
β3 Shareholder concentration + β4 Performance + β5 Equipment age + β6 Leverage +  
β7 Majority independence + β8 Dual CEO/board chair + β9 Audit committee +  
β10 Environment committee + β11 Adverse media + β12 New debt + β13 New equity +  
β14 Size + β15 Industry + e              (2) 
 
These variables are defined n Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 summarises the disclosure quality index scores and provides descriptive 
statistics for each index item and for the aggregated hard and soft disclosure scores. Data for 
hard disclosures are reported in Panel A, and soft disclosures are reported in Panel B.  
A total of 137 (67.49 per cent) of the 203 disclosing companies in the sample made 
hard disclosures while 199 (98.03 per cent) made soft disclosures. The most frequent hard 
disclosure was about governance structure and management systems at 56.65 per cent. For 
other hard disclosures, 53.69 per cent of companies made disclosures about their credibility 
through external certification or verification and only 7.89 per cent disclosed information on 
environmental spending related to GHG emissions. The highest score for the hard disclosure 
index category was 9 out of a possible 18. 
The most frequent soft disclosures were about vision and strategy at 80.79 per cent and 
a description of the company’s environmental profile at 78.82 per cent.  Only 25.62 per cent of 
companies made disclosures about environmental initiatives relating to GHG emissions. The 
highest score for the soft disclosure index category was 10 out of a possible 16. 
Table 2 about here 
 Table 3 reports the correlations between independent variables. Correlations were not 
of a sufficient magnitude to raise concerns about multicollinearity and values of variance 
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inflation statistics for all variables were less than the recommended threshold of 10 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). The highest correlation is 0.49 between size and leverage. To 
further test for multicollinearity problems with these variables, a preliminary regression 
analysis was conducted with and without the leverage variable and the results remained 
unchanged.  
The sole female director indicator variable is significantly positively correlated with 
board independence, the existence of an audit committee, and the existence of an environment 
committee. This suggests that companies with overall stronger governance are more likely to 
make a female board appointment. As expected, single and multiple women on boards are 
significantly and positively correlated with size. 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables. Descriptive 
statistics are provided for the disclosing and non-disclosing companies, along with tests of 
differences between the groups where appropriate.  
Data for the female director variables are reported in Panel B. Frequency of female 
director appointment is significantly greater for disclosing companies at 40.89 per cent, 
compared to 32.51 per cent for non-disclosing companies. A sole female director exists for 
27.59 per cent of the disclosing companies, compared to 26.11 percent for non-disclosing 
companies. The sole female director variable is not significantly different between the groups. 
In contrast, 13.30 per cent of disclosing companies have multiple female directors, compared 
to only 6.40 per cent of non-disclosing companies, with the difference significant at p<0.05. 
Additional analysis of the female director variable is presented in Panel D of Table 4, which 
shows very few companies in either group have more than two female directors. Thus, the 
extent of women on Australian company boards remains relatively limited. 
Descriptive data for the control variables are reported in Panels A and B of Table 4 
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Significant differences are observed between GHG disclosers and non-disclosers for most of 
the control variables. Disclosing companies have significantly greater average performance, 
leverage, size and inflow of new debt. The significant difference in size reflects our application 
of the closest match method for matching disclosing and non-disclosing companies. The 
difference suggests it is possible that the matching variables still have some influence. 
Therefore, we include size and industry fixed-effects variables in the disclosure quality 
analysis. We check for any effects of the matching variables by running the analysis with and 
without asset size and industry classification for the logit analysis with disclose as the 
dependent variable. Neither asset size nor any industry fixed-effects variables were significant 
when included in the regression, and made little difference to the reported results.  
Board governance is stronger for disclosing companies. A significantly greater 
percentage of disclosing companies have a majority of independent directors, non-dual 
CEO/board chair structure, larger board size, formation of an audit committee, and formation 
of an environment or sustainability committee. In addition, disclosers are more often the 
subjects of adverse media coverage than non-disclosers.  
Panel C provides industry data for the sample. The reported percentages are the same 
for the disclosing and non-disclosing company groups because the sample is matched on 
industry. The most frequent industry classifications are materials, financials, industrials and 
energy. The financials industry group has the highest percentage of female directors at 57.95 
percent, followed by consumer discretionary at 46.15 percent and then consumer staples at 
44.44 percent. These three industry groups also have the highest percentage of female directors 
for analysis across disclosing and non-disclosing companies. Comparison of female director 
percentages for industry groups across disclosing and non-disclosing companies show 
disclosing companies have a higher percentage of female directors for seven of the ten reported 
groups. 
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 Table 4 about here 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 5 provide results of logistic regression analysis (Model 1) for the matched sample 
of GHG disclosing and non-disclosing companies. This analysis partially tests hypothesis one, 
that companies with women on boards are more likely to make GHG emissions related 
disclosure. The indicator variable for the existence of a sole female director is not significant. 
However, the multiple female director variable is significant (p<0.05) with a positive 
coefficient. This indicates that companies with multiple female directors are more likely to 
make GHG emissions related disclosures. The result supports the hypothesis but the positive 
relation between gender diversity and disclosure is conditional on the existence of more than 
one female director. 
In Model 1, significant results are found for several of the control variables. Lower 
shareholder concentration is related to GHG emissions disclosure (p<0.05), in support of 
stewardship theory. An additional explanation is that companies with concentrated 
shareholding tend to provide private information to investors regarding risk and opportunities 
related to GHG emissions, while companies with more dispersed ownership provide more 
annual and sustainability report disclosures. Performance (p<0.01), existence of a dual 
CEO/board chair (p<0.05), the existence of an environment or sustainability committee 
(p<0.10), and acquisition of new debt (p<0.01) are significantly associated with more GHG 
emissions disclosure.  
Table 5 also provides results of the Tobit regression analyses that test the second part 
of the hypothesis. Regressions for total (Model 2), hard (Model 3) and soft disclosures (Model 
4) are reported. The sole female director variable is not significant for the total disclosure 
regression (Model 2). However, the multiple female director variable is significant (p<0.05) 
and has a positive coefficient. Therefore, companies with multiple female directors have higher 
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total GHG emissions related disclosures. Similar results are observed for Models 3 and 4, 
which test hard and soft disclosures respectively. The sole female director variable is not 
significant, while the multiple female director variable is significant. Overall, the results 
support our hypothesis but the expected positive association between women on boards and 
the quality of GHG related disclosure is conditional on the existence of more than one female 
director on the board. 
Results for the control variables are similar for the total, hard and soft disclosure index 
models (Models 2, 3 and 4). A majority of independent directors is significant for the total and 
soft disclosure models (p<0.10). The existence of an environmental board sub-committee and 
a dual CEO/board chair are significant (p<0.05) in all models. Financial performance and issue 
of new debt are significant (p<0.01) in all models for the financial controls. Equipment age and 
leverage are marginally significant (p<0.10) in the soft disclosure model only. The size variable 
is only significant in the hard disclosure model (p<0.05). This suggests that larger companies 
are more likely to make verifiable disclosures because of their greater sensitivity to the 
perception of poor GHG emissions performance. Finally, we find that concentrated 
shareholding is significant with a negative coefficient in the total (p<0.05), hard (p<0.10) and 
soft (p<0.05) disclosure models. Again, this is consistent with stewardship theory, with 
dispersed ownership leading to directors providing higher quality annual and sustainability 
report disclosures of GHG emissions. 
Table 5 about here 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
Our theory and hypothesis section suggests that companies in the Australian setting that 
have women on their boards are innovative early adopters of board gender diversity. It is 
possible that innovative companies are also more likely to make GHG emissions disclosures. 
In addition, it is possible that women self-select onto boards of companies that demonstrate 
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corporate social responsibility by their GHG emissions disclosure. Therefore, the observed 
relation in our main analysis between women on boards and GHG emission disclosure may be 
affected by omitted variables or reverse-causation problems (Gippel et al., 2015; Brown et al., 
2011; Schultz et al., 2010). These endogeneity issues have potential confounding effects for 
our analysis.  
We test our results for robustness to potential effects of women on boards being an 
endogenous variable. Within our observational data, companies with women on their board are 
analogous to a treatment group, yet the treatment is not randomised because of the endogeneity 
issues described above. We use the treatment effect variation of the Heckman (1979) selection 
model to address this econometric problem (Maddala 1983; Guo and Fraser 2014). The analysis 
is conducted using the STATA etregress routine, with a control function estimation used to 
calculate the conditional probability of a single or multiple female director on the board, which 
is included as the test variable in Model 1. The female director variables remain significant in 
this regression if our results regarding women on boards are robust to the effects of 
endogeneity. 
Following prior studies (Srinidhi et al., 2011; Ben-Amar et al., 2015), the selection 
model includes governance variables, a measure of shareholder concentration, and financial 
and industry variables. We also include an indicator variable for the presence of directors with 
multiple directorships as wider experience is likely to influence the board to understand the 
value of women on boards.  
The untabulated results of the endogenous treatment-regression model show the 
conditional probability of the multiple female director variable is significant. This confirms the 
main result that multiple female directors have a positive influence on GHG emissions 
disclosure. The results for the control variables in the endogenous treatment-regression model 
are substantively the same as those reported in the main analysis. 
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We also consider the implications of appointment of female directors as a symbolic 
gesture to enhance gender diversity. When female director appointments are properly 
motivated, there is an increased likelihood of a systematic improvement in board processes. 
We present additional analysis in Table 6 to determine whether female director expertise is 
related to GHG disclosure. For this analysis, expertise is measured according to whether a 
female director has board appointments at other companies. Dichotomous variables are used 
which indicate whether a female director is a sole board member or a member of multiple 
boards. The variable female director – sole appointment is coded one if female board members 
are only appointed to a single board, and zero otherwise. The variable female director – 
multiple appointment is coded one if a female board member is appointed to multiple boards, 
and zero otherwise.  
Table 6 about here 
We find that the sole appointment variable is not significant, but the multiple 
appointment variable is marginally significant and positively associated (p<0.10) with total 
GHG related disclosures and soft disclosures (p<0.05). Therefore, the presence of an 
experienced female director on the board is associated with increased disclosure quality. Given 
that experienced female directors are unlikely to be token appointments, the result indicates 
that inclusion of women on boards motivated to increase board capital is positively associated 
with GHG emissions related disclosure quality. 
It is possible that companies in our 2007 sample were larger companies and therefore 
subject to reporting thresholds for the first NGER Act reporting year of 2008. Larger companies 
potentially have bigger more diverse boards and they could have started to produce higher 
quality reports in anticipation of the new legislation. To test our results to this possible 
confounding effect, we conduct additional analysis that controls for future NGER Act 
reporting. First, we identify companies in our sample that report under the NGER Act in 2008 
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or 2009 and create a dummy variable that indicates reporting in either year. We re-run the main 
analysis including this control variable, and the (unreported) results for the female director 
variables remain unchanged. In addition, we re-run the main analysis with a reduced sample 
that excludes companies that reported in 2008 or 2009 under the NGER Act and their matched 
company. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 7. Again, we find the results for 
the female director variables remain unchanged except for increased levels of significance for 
the multiple female director variable. 
Table 7 about here 
W conduct a longitudinal case study covering the Annual Reports from 2013 to 2015 
of Australian Ethical Investment Ltd (EAI) to support our empirical results and illustrate the 
influence of multiple women on the board and the disclosures of GHG emissions.  Australian 
Ethical Investment Ltd (AEI) was established in 1986 as an independent funds manager to 
allow investors to invest their funds in ethical and socially responsible operations (AEI, 
20013). On 17 December 2002, AEI became a listed public company and a member of the 
ASX (AEI, 2003).This company had no requirement to report under the NHER act in 2008 or 
2009. 
Male directors have typically dominated the AEI board with backgrounds in banking, 
finance and economics. By 2006, three females held positions as independent directors and at 
the end of the 2007 reporting period there were four female directors.  Female directors while 
serving together have made a significant impact on the GHG emissions and sustainable 
reporting and reputation of this company.  
Caroline Le Couteur, was a founding member and director of AEI for 18 years. She 
holds degrees in economics and business, and a graduate diploma in environmental and 
development management. Caroline is recognised with embedding sustainability reporting in 
the company, and been praised for her focus on managing and reporting on the company’s 
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environmental footprint (EAI, 2003-2015).  In 2005, Naomi Edwards with a formal 
qualification of a BSc (Hons) joined the AEI board as a non-executive director and chair and 
held these positions until March 2011.  The company under Naomi’s leadership entered into 
commitments with external parties concerned with the prevention of environmental harm. By 
2006 AEI was a signatory to two prominent initiatives, the Carbon Disclosure Project and the 
UN Principles for Responsible Investment, roles still held by the company 2016. In 2007 the 
company moved into refurbished low-energy and environmentally friendly commercial 
premises (EAI, 2003-2015).  
AEI was the winner of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 2005 
award for sustainability reporting. The company received a special commendation in the 
2007 United Nations Association of Australia World Environment Day Awards, and was the 
Commercial Winner and the Overall Winner of the Keep Australia Beautiful ACT 
Sustainable Cities Awards that same year. The company was also recognised as the first 
runner up for the best non-financial reporting by a small to medium enterprise at the 2007 CR 
Reporting Awards, by CorporateRegister.com, the biggest online directory of corporate 
responsibility and sustainability reports in the world (EAI, 2003-2015).  
They won the Banksia Environmental Foundation award for the Built Environment 
for their commercial premises in 2008 and these premises also received a six-star Green Star 
Certified Rating by the Green Building council of Australia. In 2008, AEI’s Australian 
Ethical Retail Superannuation Fund received the inaugural Infinity Award, recognition by the 
Conference of Major Super Funds, for being Australia’s most environmentally and socially 
conscious fund and leader in both sustainable investment and sustainable business practices 
(EAI, 2003-2015).   
6. Conclusion 
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The empirical results and our case study show that companies with multiple women on 
the board have superior quantity and quality of GHG emissions related disclosure. This is 
important research because it provides evidence to companies when electing their boards. It is 
also important for regulators to have this evidence when they debate the need for mandatory 
quotas of females on boards. 
The cross-sectional analysis conducted in this study does not address the important 
question of how changes in the number of women on boards are related to board performance 
in the area of GHG emissions disclosure. This represents an opportunity for future research. 
Countries such as Australia that adopt a comply or explain approach to board diversity provide 
an ideal setting for examining this issue, and provides a point of comparison for studies 
conducted in settings where mandatory quotas exist. 
Our findings highlight research issues that could be addressed in future studies. For 
example, we find that the existence of multiple female directors is required for women on 
boards to have an impact on voluntary GHG emission disclosures. This raises questions 
regarding the optimal proportion of female directors required to improve board processes and 
changes required to increase female representation on Australian boards.  
Our study has the limitation of not being generalisable to other countries so that similar 
research should be conducted in other countries. It also has the limitation that an index is used 
to measure GHG emission related disclosures and indexes are subjective. However, despite 
these shortcomings, content analysis allows for a more refined and detailed classification 
measure of GHG emissions disclosure and provides incremental insight regarding the degrees 
and dimensions of reporting (Halme and Huse, 1997). 
.
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Table 1 
Disclose = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company made a GHG emissions related disclosure, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Total = GHG emissions related disclosures determined by content analysis index. 
Hard = Hard GHG emissions related disclosures determined by content analysis index. 
Soft = Soft GHG emissions related disclosures determined by content analysis index. 
Sole female director = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the board has a sole female director, and 0 
otherwise. 
Multiple female director = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the board has more than one female 
director, and 0 otherwise. 
Shareholder concentration = Percentage of ordinary shareholders with 5 percent or greater 
shareholding. 
Performance = Tobin’s Q, calculated as the sum of market value of common equity plus the 
book value of total debt and preferred shares divided by book value of total assets, winsorised 
at 1 percent. 
Equipment age = Proxy for age of property, plant and equipment, measured as accumulated 
depreciation of property, plant and equipment divided by cost of property, plant and equipment, 
winsorised at 1 percent. 
Leverage = Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Majority independence = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has a majority of 
independent directors on the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Dual CEO/Chair = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the CEO is also the board chair, and 0 
otherwise. 
Audit committee = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 
otherwise. 
Environment committee = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has an environment or 
sustainability committee, and 0 otherwise.  
Adverse media = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company experiences adverse media 
reporting regarding its environmental performance in 2006 to 2007, and 0 otherwise. 
New debt = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has proceeds from borrowing recorded 
in the 2008 statement of cash flows, and 0 otherwise. 
New equity = Dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has proceeds from issues recorded in 
the 2008 statement of cash flows, and 0 otherwise. 
Size = Natural log of total assets. 
Industry = Dummy variables, determined by the Global Industry Classification Standard sector 
grouping. 
Audit committee = dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2: GHG Emissions Related Disclosure Index (n=203) 
Panel A: Hard Disclosure Items 
Number of 
Companies 
(%) 
High (low) 
Score 
 Companies making disclosures 137 (67.49%) 9(0) 
A1 Governance structure and management systems (max score 5) 115 (56.65%) 4(0) 
1 Existence of a Department for pollution control and/or management 
positions for environmental management 14 (6.9%)  
2 Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or 
customers regarding environmental practices  15 (7.39)  
3 Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental policies 68 (33.50)  
4 Implementation of ISO 14001 at the plant and/or firm level 22 (8.4%)  
5 Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance 8 (3.94%)  
A2 Credibility (max score 10) 109 (53.69%) 4(0) 
1 Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a 
CERES report 7 (3.45%)  
2 Independent verification/assurance about environmental information 
disclosed 9 (4.43%)  
3 Periodic independent verifications/audits on environmental 
performance and/or systems 24 (11.82%)  
4 Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies 22 (10.84%)  
5 Product Certification with respect to environmental impact 6 (2.96%)  
6 External environmental performance awards and/or inclusion in a 
sustainability index 41 (20.20%)  
7 Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process 1 (0.49%)  
8 Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by 
EPA or Department of Energy 18 (8.87%)  
9 Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve 
environmental practices 38 (18.72%)  
10 Participation in other environmental organisations/associations to 
improve environmental practices 18 (8.87%)  
A3 Environmental spending (max score 3) 16 (7.89%) 2(0) 
1 Summary of dollar savings arising from environment initiatives to 
the company 5 (2.46%)  
2 Amount spent on technologies, R & D and/or innovations to 
enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency 7 (3.44%)  
3 Amount spent on fines related to environmental issues 9 (4.43%)  
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Table 2: GHG Emissions Related Disclosure Index (n=203) (continued) 
Panel B: Soft Disclosure Items 
Number of 
Companies 
(%) 
High (low) 
Score 
 Companies making disclosures 199 (98.03%) 10(0) 
A4 Vision and strategy claims (max score 6) 164 (80.79) 6(0) 
1 CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to 
shareholders and/or stakeholder 20 (9.85%)  
2 A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and 
principles, environmental codes of conduct 111 (54.67%)  
3 A statement about formal management systems regarding 
environmental risk and performance 101 (49.75%)  
4 A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and 
evaluations of its environmental performance 65 (32.02%)  
5 A statement of measurable goals in terms of future environmental 
performance 18 (8.87%)  
6 A statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new 
technologies 82 (40.39%)  
A5 Environmental profile (max score is 4) 160 (78.82%) 3(0) 
1 A statement about the firm’s compliance (or lack thereof) with 
specific environmental standards 145 (71.43%)  
2 An overview of environmental impact of the industry 8 (3.94%)  
3 An overview of how the business operations and/or products and 
services impact the environment 45 (22.17%)  
4 An overview about specific environmental innovations and/or new 
technologies 1 (0.49%)  
A6 Environmental initiatives (max score is 6) 52 (25.62%) 3(0) 
1 A substantive description of employee training in environmental 
management and operations 9 (4.43%)  
2 Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents 0 (0.00%)  
3 Internal environmental awards 2 (0.99%)  
4 Internal environmental audits 28 (13.79%)  
5 Internal certification of environmental programs 2 (0.99%)  
6 Community involvement and/or donations related to environment 
(if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7) 19 (9.36%)  
Notes: The index is adapted from Clarkson et al., 2008. Each index item is coded as 1 indicating disclosure, or 0 
indicating no disclosure. 
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Table 3: Correlations (n=406) 
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Sole female director 
 
            
Multiple female directors ***-0.20 
 
           
Shareholder concentration -0.01 -0.05 
 
          
Performance -0.08 ***-0.15 **0.12 
 
         
Equipment age 0.09 **0.11 -0.04 -0.05 
 
        
Leverage **0.13 ***0.32 0.07 ***-0.32 ***0.18 
 
       
Size ***0.21 ***0.39 ***0.14 ***-0.33 -0.02 ***0.49 
 
      
Majority independence ***0.14 ***0.21 0.08 **-0.12 -0.01 ***0.22 ***0.31 
 
     
Dual CEO/board chair ***-0.13 -0.07 -0.02 0.03 0.03 **-0.10 ***-0.17 -0.03 
 
    
Audit committee **0.11 **0.11 *0.10 *-0.08 0.03 ***0.27 ***0.40 ***0.21 ***-0.16 
 
   
Environment committee **0.11 0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 ***0.19 ***0.13 -0.05 **0.11 
 
  
Adverse media 0.04 **0.10 ***0.25 -0.03 **-0.12 **0.12 ***0.33 ***0.16 -0.05 ***0.16 ***0.18 
 
 
New debt *0.09 0.00 0.06 -0.07 *-0.10 ***0.24 ***0.21 -0.01 -0.07 ***0.15 **0.11 0.05 
 
New equity 0.02 -0.04 ***0.16 ***0.20 0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 0.02 *-0.09 -0.05 0.00 *0.10 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. All variables are measured in the year 2007 unless noted. 
Variable definitions:  
Audit committee = dummy variable, coded 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests 
Variable Disclosing Companies (n=203) Non-Disclosing Companies (n=203) Test Statistic 
Panel A Continuous Variables Mean Median St.Dev. Min. Max 
Mea
n 
Media
n 
St.De
v Min. Max. t statistic 
Shareholder concentration 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.98 0.30 0.18 0.41 0.00 2.42 0.92 
Performance 2.28 1.58 2.05 0.12 11.74 1.78 
1.45 1.31 0.01 9.98 ***-2.91 
Equipment age 0.35 0.38 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.39 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.99 *1.32 
Leverage 0.49 0.51 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.46 0.25 1.00 0.02 **-1.66 
Size 20.33 20.62 2.59 14.12 
27.0
6 19.83 
19.99 2.33 9.82 24.41 **-2.07 
Board size 6.60 6.00 2.31 3.00 16.00 6.11 
6.00 2.05 3.00 12.00 **-2.22 
    
Panel B Dichotomous 
Variables Percentage 
Percentage Chi-square 
Female director 40.89 32.51 **3.06 
Sole female director 27.59 26.11 0.11 
Multiple female director 13.30 6.40 **5.44 
Majority independence 70.94 63.55 *2.52 
Dual CEO/board chair 7.39 15.76 ***6.95 
Audit committee 93.10 86.21 **5.21 
Environment committee 17.24 8.87 ***6.27 
Adverse media 25.62 18.72 **2.80 
New debt 70.44 45.32 ***26.28 
New equity 61.08 61.58 0.01 
    
 
Panel C Industry Analysis Percentage Percentage with  Female Directors 
Disclosing Companies 
Percentage with  
Female Directors 
Non-Disclosing Companies  
Percentage with  
Female Directors 
Energy 15.27 18.03 29.03 6.67 
Materials 25.12 21.00 25.49 16.33 
Industrials 14.78 24.19 26.67 21.88 
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Consumer Discretionary 9.85 46.15 45.00 47.37 
Consumer Staples 4.43 44.44 55.56 33.33 
Financials 21.18 57.95 58.14 57.78 
Utilities 3.45 21.43 28.57 14.29 
Health 2.46 70.00 60.00 80.00 
Information Technology 2.46 44.44 40.00 50.00 
Telecommunications 1.00 75.00 100.00 50.00 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Tests (continued) 
 
 Disclosing Companies (n=203) Non-Disclosing Companies (n=203) 
Panel D  Number of Female Directors Number of Companies Number of Companies 
0 120 136 
1 55 53 
2 18 11 
3 8 2 
4 1 0 
5 1 0 
6 0 1 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
All variables are measured in the year 2007 unless noted. 
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Table 5: Logit and Tobit Regression Results (n=406) 
  Model 1: 
GHG Disclosers versus 
Non GHG Disclosers 
Model 2: 
Total Disclosures 
Model 3: 
Hard Disclosures 
Model 4: 
Soft Disclosures 
 Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Marginal 
Effect) 
z 
statistic Coefficient 
t 
statistic Coefficient 
t 
statistic Coefficient 
t 
statistic 
          
Constant  -1.63 ***-3.20 -8.92 ***-2.61 -11.64 ***-4.43 -4.46 **-1.98 
Sole female director + -0.02 (-0.01) -0.09 0.49 0.71 0.25 0.55 0.38 0.83 
Multiple female director + 0.79 (0.17) **1.86 1.98 **1.82 1.20 **1.75 1.36 **1.90 
Shareholder concentration 
 
-0.73 (-0.16) **-2.04 -2.27 **-2.34 -0.93 *-1.45 -1.60 **-2.49 
Performance + 0.32 (0.07) ***3.96 0.59 ***3.41 0.36 ***2.97 0.39 ***3.36 
Equipment age - -0.30 (-0.07) -0.66 -0.94 -0.78 0.34 0.42 -1.05 *-1.32 
Leverage + 0.32 (0.07) 0.60 1.29 0.88 -0.45 -0.45 1.27 *1.31 
Majority independence + 0.31 (0.05) 1.23 1.02 *1.55 0.33 0.75 0.84 *1.54 
Dual CEO/board chair - -0.76 (-0.16) **-2.03 -1.88 **-1.92 -1.32 **-1.88 -1.12 **-1.75 
Audit committee + 0.32 (0.07) 0.80 1.18 1.05 1.13 *1.34 0.84 1.14 
Environment committee + 0.54 (0.12) *1.59 2.38 ***2.90 1.53 ***3.02 1.37 **2.52 
Adverse media + 0.28 (0.06) 1.01 0.63 0.84 -0.05 -0.10 0.55 1.12 
New debt + 1.13 (0.25) ***4.77 3.29 ***5.20 2.14 ***4.93 2.04 ***4.90 
New equity + -0.20 (-0.01) -0.86 -0.65 -1.09 -0.48 -1.23 -0.38 -0.97 
Size +   0.15 0.92 0.24 **2.09 0.05 0.46 
          
Model          
LR Chi Square Statistic  ***67.19  ***90.57  **92.03  ***85.15  
Pseudo R Square  0.12  0.06  0.09  0.06  
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 6: Logit and Tobit Regression Results (n=406) 
  Model 1: 
GHG Disclosers versus 
Non GHG Disclosers 
Model 2: 
Total Disclosures 
Model 3: 
Hard Disclosures 
Model 4: 
Soft Disclosures 
 Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(Marginal 
Effect) 
z 
statistic Coefficient 
t 
statistic Coefficient 
t 
statistic Coefficient 
t 
statistic 
          
Constant  -1.72 ***-3.34 -8.92 **-2.60 -11.77 ***-4.47 -4.33 **-1.92 
Female Director –  
Sole Appointment 
+ -0.54 (-0.11) -1.36 -0.64 -0.61 -0.49 -0.68 -0.45 -0.65 
Female Director –  
Multiple Appointment 
+ 0.35 (0.08) 1.25 1.13 *1.50 0.53 1.11 0.90 **1.82  
Shareholder concentration 
 
-0.74 (-0.16) **-2.09 -2.29 **-2.36 -0.95 *-1.49 -1.60 **-2.50 
Performance + 0.33 (0.07) ***4.05 0.62 ***3.52 0.38 ***3.10 0.40 ***3.48 
Equipment age - -0.22 (-0.05) -0.47 -0.85 -0.70 0.42 0.52 -1.00 *-1.26 
Leverage + 0.60 (0.13) 1.15 1.68 1.15 -0.18 -0.18 1.54 *1.60 
Majority independence + 0.24 (0.05) 0.94 0.95 *1.43 0.32 0.71 0.60 *1.37 
Dual CEO/board chair - -0.71 9-0.15) *-1.90 -1.84 **-1.87 -1.30 **-1.84 -1.08 *-1.68 
Audit committee + 0.35 (0.07) 0.85 1.16 1.04 1.11 *1.32 0.84 1.14 
Environment committee + 0.58 (0.12) *1.69 2.42 ***2.94 1.56 ***3.06 1.39 ***2.55 
Adverse media + 0.26 (0.06) 0.93 0.56 0.75 0.07 0.16 0.49 1.00 
New debt + 1.06 (0.22) ***4.51 3.16 ***5.03 2.07 ***4.80 1.95 ***4.72 
New equity + -0.18 (0.04) -0.78 -0.64 -1.06 -0.42 -1.20 -0.38 -0.95 
Size +   0.17 1.03 0.26 **2.27 0.06 0.51 
          
Model          
LR Chi Square Statistic    ***90.65  ***91.27  ***86.25  
Pseudo R Square    0.06  0.09  0.06  
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
Average marginal effects are reported for logit analysis in Model 1. 
All variables are measured in the year 2007 unless noted. 
Industry variables included in Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 are not reported. 
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Table 7: NGER Robustness Results (n=280) 
  Model 2: 
Total Disclosures 
Model 3: 
Hard Disclosures 
Model 4: 
Soft Disclosures 
 Expected 
Sign Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic Coefficient t statistic 
        
Constant  -6.20 **-1.66 -10.95 ***-3.60 -2.45 -0.97 
Sole female director + -0.34 -0.42 -0.40 -0.70 -0.17 -0.31 
Multiple female director + 3.69 ***2.85 2.40 ***2.74 2.37 ***2.69 
Shareholder concentration 
 
-0.56 -0.44 0.12 0.13 -0.60 -0.70 
Performance + 0.55 ***3.29 0.36 ***2.83 0.36 ***3.17 
Equipment age - -0.87 -0.69 0.14 0.15 -0.88 -1.04 
Leverage + 2.31 *1.45 0.38 0.33 1.90 **1.77 
Majority independence + 0.99 *1.41 0.08 0.16 0.72 *1.51 
Dual CEO/board chair - -1.83 **-1.77 -1.48 -1.80 -1.11 *1.59 
Audit committee + 1.02 0.97 0.83 0.99 0.83 1.15 
Environment committee + 1.66 *1.49 1.02 *1.38 1.05 *1.39 
Adverse media + 0.35 0.37 -0.03 -0.05 0.20 0.31 
New debt + 2.36 ***3.44 1.68 ***3.30 1.44 ***3.10 
New equity + -1.35 **-2.07 -0.87 **-1.86 -0.83 **-1.87 
Size + 0.05 0.26 0.26 **1.79 -0.05 -0.34 
        
Model        
LR Chi Square Statistic  ***54.79   ***59.83  ***48.53 
Pseudo R Square  0.05   0.09  0.05 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  
All variables are measured in the year 2007 unless noted. 
